Conclusion

A comparative analysis of these fifteen publications raises three fundamental questions: (a) whether the individual allegations have been sufficiently linked to Vardanyan’s personal actions and intent; (b) whether the legal classification of the offenses and the sentences imposed in the judgment comply with the applicable law; and (c) what consequences may arise from interpreting Artsakh’s state and public institutions as part of a single “criminal organization.”

The Question of Chronology and Individual Criminal Responsibility

In numerous articles in the series, Simonyan identifies alleged incidents that predate Vardanyan’s relocation to Artsakh or his tenure as State Minister. This chronological discrepancy is crucial. As the publications demonstrate, in virtually none of the episodes did the court present evidence linking Vardanyan personally to a specific criminal offense. Instead, individual culpability was replaced by a theory of collective responsibility based on alleged membership in a “criminal organization.”

The International Commission of Jurists has likewise noted that the charges relating to events in 1988, when Vardanyan was a student at Moscow State University, “raise fundamental concerns from the perspective of the principle of legality” and suggest an arbitrary application of criminal law.

An examination of the judgment confirms Simonyan’s observations. Of the 540 victims and 77 legal successors questioned in court, only three mention Vardanyan by name, without describing any act committed by him. Furthermore, none of the more than 2,000 forensic medical reports cited in the judgment mentions his name.

The suffering of all victims and displaced persons affected by the conflict deserves respect. However, attributing responsibility for three decades of events to a single individual is not justice, but political retribution.

Internal Inconsistencies in the Judgment

A preliminary comparison of the primary documents has revealed a number of serious internal contradictions.

At the beginning of the judgment, Vardanyan is described as having no previous convictions. Yet, in its discussion of aggravating circumstances, the court refers to recidivism.

The list of sentences in the judgment includes a 14-year prison term under Article 214-2 of the Criminal Code, although this provision is not mentioned anywhere in the 1,969-page indictment and appears only once in the 1,864-page judgment—in the list of sentences.

Taron Simonyan also points out that the judgment treats Vardanyan’s refusal to testify as evidence of guilt, although the right not to testify is a constitutional right of the defendant.

With regard to Article 270-1.2 of the Criminal Code, the court acknowledged that the statute of limitations had expired but nevertheless found Vardanyan guilty without imposing a sentence, citing Article 44.2.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The legality of this procedure under the circumstances requires separate examination.

Imposing a sentence under a provision that was never mentioned in the charges and does not appear in the section establishing guilt violates the defendant’s right to be clearly informed of the charges against him and to defend himself against them—a cornerstone of a fair trial.

A comprehensive assessment of the legal consequences of these circumstances requires a separate examination of the applicable version of the Criminal Code and the court’s reasoning.

The Armenian National Committee’s special report in English documents these contradictions, providing page references to both the indictment and the judgment.

Broader Legal and State-Level Implications

In his September 28 interview, Simonyan expressed concern that the overarching historical and legal narrative constructed through the judgment could serve as a basis for new claims against Armenia.

The materials in this compilation demonstrate that such a broad framework is indeed employed in the indictment, and the associated risk cannot be ignored. A judicial precedent characterizing the entire state system of Artsakh as a “criminal organization” could be used both to advance new claims against Armenia and to deny the right of the Armenians of Artsakh to return to their homeland safely and with dignity.

Another issue concerns the legal mechanisms available to protect the rights of the prisoners. Simonyan has emphasized the importance of Armenia considering interstate treaty-based and judicial mechanisms.

The path to international legal protection has already been opened. In July 2026, an application on behalf of Vardanyan was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights. On August 21, an application was also lodged on behalf of 15 Armenian prisoners convicted in the related joint proceedings, alleging violations of Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 7 (no punishment without law) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Armenian National Committee calls upon the competent authorities of the Republic of Armenia to make full use of all available interstate, treaty-based, and judicial mechanisms to protect the rights of Armenian prisoners and secure their return to their homeland.

International Response

The position of the European Parliament is unequivocal. Through resolutions adopted on March 13, 2025, April 30, 2026, and October 8, 2026, it condemned the detention of Armenian prisoners of war, hostages, and detainees, including former leaders of Artsakh, and demanded their immediate and unconditional release.

The 2025 resolution explicitly described these proceedings as “show trials” and called for sanctions against Azerbaijani officials responsible for human rights violations. The October 2026 resolution made the conclusion of a future EU–Azerbaijan partnership agreement conditional upon tangible improvements in human rights, including the release of political prisoners.

In response to the April resolution, Azerbaijan summoned the EU ambassador, while the Azerbaijani parliament announced that it was severing ties with the European Parliament.

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), in Resolution 2580 of January 27, 2025, reiterated its call for Azerbaijan to release the detained representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh and all Armenian prisoners of war held in Azerbaijan.

In a resolution adopted in January 2026, PACE further demanded the immediate release of all persons detained on politically motivated grounds, “including the 23 Armenian detainees.”

On March 3, 2025, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk stated during the 58th session of the UN Human Rights Council:

“All those arbitrarily detained in Azerbaijan, including ethnic Armenians, must be released immediately.”

On April 7, 2025, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty stated before PACE that the situation of Armenian prisoners was among his priorities, that he was monitoring their trials, and that he had twice requested permission to visit Baku.

In the United States, Senators Gary Peters, Edward Markey, Bill Cassidy, and Thom Tillis, in an April 4, 2024 letter to the Secretary of State, specifically named Ruben Vardanyan and called for the release of the detained leaders of Artsakh to be made a priority, including as a condition of any peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On July 22, 2026, the House Foreign Affairs Committee adopted an amendment introduced by Congressman Brad Sherman by a vote of 44 to 7, calling on Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all Armenian prisoners of war and political prisoners.

On October 5, 2026, 101 members of Congress—26 senators and 75 representatives—called on Secretary of State Marco Rubio to suspend U.S. military assistance to Azerbaijan until it releases Armenian prisoners, ensures the protection of Armenian cultural heritage, and withdraws its forces from Armenian territory.

In January 2025, as the trials in Baku began, Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly called for the “unconditional release of all Armenian prisoners of war and ethnic Armenians arbitrarily detained in Azerbaijan.”

On January 15, 2026, Canada welcomed the release of four Armenian prisoners as a “positive step toward a just and lasting peace,” adding:

“…we look forward to continued confidence-building measures, including further prisoner releases, as Azerbaijan and Armenia move toward mutual peace and prosperity.”

In March 2025, the Government of the United Kingdom stated in the House of Lords that it continued to call for the release of all remaining prisoners of war and had urged Azerbaijan to ensure fair trials and safe conditions of detention for those detained since September 2023.

On April 1, 2025, Jessica Morden, Chair of the British Parliament’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Armenia, together with the group’s vice-chairs, called on the government to exert pressure on Azerbaijan to secure the release of the 23 Armenian prisoners held in Baku. They also expressed particular concern about Ruben Vardanyan’s health.

On February 3, 2026, the French National Assembly adopted a resolution by 183 votes to none condemning the “arbitrary imprisonment and trial of the political leaders of the Republic of Artsakh” and demanding “their immediate and unconditional release.”

The preamble to the resolution states that they are being tried before a military court on “unfounded, or even entirely fabricated” charges, that preliminary hearings were held behind closed doors, and that international observers, civil society organizations, and foreign media have been denied access.

The French Senate had already called for the immediate release of Artsakh’s leaders on January 17, 2024. In June 2026, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs reiterated that France “calls for the release of all persons arbitrarily detained in Azerbaijan.”

Demands of the Armenian National Committee

On the basis of the facts presented in this compilation, the Armenian National Committee calls upon the international community, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the European Union, and the governments and parliaments of individual states to demand:

– The immediate and unconditional release of Ruben Vardanyan and all Armenian prisoners of war and detainees held in Azerbaijan, including the former leaders of Artsakh.

– A public assessment of the judgment issued by the Baku Military Court as a judicial act that grossly violates international fair trial standards.

– Unhindered and regular access to the prisoners for the International Committee of the Red Cross (whose office in Azerbaijan was closed in September 2025), the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly, UN Special Rapporteurs, and Council of Europe bodies.

– The prioritization of the release of Armenian prisoners and human rights issues in all bilateral and multilateral engagement with Azerbaijan, including the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, given that the agreement initialed in Washington in August 2025 contains no provisions concerning Armenian prisoners.

– Support for the applications lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of Vardanyan and the other Armenian prisoners, including through third-party interventions by Council of Europe member states.

– The imposition of targeted sanctions against Azerbaijani officials responsible for the arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of Armenian prisoners, as called for by the European Parliament.

The complete preservation of the published analyses and their continued professional examination constitute our shared objective.

Accordingly, the conclusion of this Armenian-language publication does not mark the end of the legal research. Rather, it establishes a documentary foundation for more in-depth, critical, and verifiable discussions, as well as further human rights advocacy before international bodies.